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Essays 
IS SOLITARY CONFINEMENT A PUNISHMENT? 
John F. Stinneford 
ABSTRACT—The United States Constitution imposes a variety of constraints 
on the imposition of punishment, including the requirements that the 
punishment be authorized by a preexisting penal statute and ordered by a 
lawful judicial sentence. Today, prison administrators impose solitary 
confinement on thousands of prisoners despite the fact that neither of these 
requirements has been met. Is this imposition a “punishment without law,” 
or is it a mere exercise of administrative discretion?  In an 1890 case called 
In re Medley, the Supreme Court held that solitary confinement is a separate 
punishment subject to constitutional restraints, but it has ignored this holding 
in recent decades, treating the imposition of solitary confinement as though 
it were a mere act of administrative discretion. This Essay asks whether the 
Medley Court or the modern Court is correct as a matter of constitutional law 
and concludes that the Medley Court is correct. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nulla poena sine lege—no punishment without law—is one of the 
oldest and most universally accepted principles of English and American 
law.1 Today, prison administrators place thousands of American prisoners in 
long-term solitary confinement2 despite the fact that such placement is 
authorized neither by penal statute nor by judicial sentence.3 Is solitary 
confinement “punishment without law,” or is it a mere exercise of 
administrative discretion? 
Imagine a prisoner is present during a violent altercation in the prison 
yard. The warden suspects that the prisoner was an instigator of the fight, 
and orders that the prisoner be publicly flogged to deter both this prisoner 
 
 1 See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165 (1937) (tracing the historical roots 
of the principle). 
 2 See THE ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS & THE LIMAN CTR. FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, REFORMING 
RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: THE 2018 ASCA-LIMAN NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF TIME-IN-CELL 4, 14 (2018) 
[hereinafter REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING] (estimating that 60,000 prisoners are currently kept in 
solitary confinement, of whom approximately 7,700 have spent a year or more in solitary confinement 
and nearly 2,000 have spent six years or more in solitary confinement). 
 3 See Alexander A. Reinert, Solitary Troubles, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 927, 959–60 (2018). A 
number of states have enacted statutes that purport to authorize prison administrators to impose solitary 
confinement on those who break prison rules. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 641.18 (West 2008) 
(allowing imposition of solitary confinement “[w]hen any prisoner is unruly or disobeys any regulation 
for the management of jails”).  If solitary confinement is a punishment for constitutional purposes, 
however, such statutory authorizations are invalid because they permit punishment without 
constitutionally mandated procedures such as a jury trial. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 
228 (1896) (holding that the use of summary procedure before imposing sentence of imprisonment at 
hard labor is unconstitutional). 
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and others from engaging in future acts of violence. Is this flogging a 
punishment? 
Now imagine a slightly different scenario. A federal judge sentences a 
gang member to the statutory maximum sentence of five years in prison and 
a $250,000 fine for illegally growing twenty-five marijuana plants. When the 
offender arrives at prison, the warden informs him that he will add one day 
to the prisoner’s sentence for every day the prisoner fails to identify the other 
gang members he knows in the prison. As a result, the offender spends an 
extra five years in prison. Is this additional prison time a punishment? 
Now imagine a third scenario. Imagine that instead of a flogging or 
extra prison time, the warden transfers the prisoner to a higher security 
facility to minimize the risk of violence or gang activity. As a result, the 
prisoner suffers greater restrictions on his liberty and experiences more 
discomfort than he would in a lower security facility. Is this transfer a 
punishment? 
Many of us would probably consider the first two scenarios to be clear 
examples of punishment, but we might not be so sure about the third. In all 
three cases, a government official inflicts additional pain or imposes 
additional restrictions on a prisoner’s liberty. In all three cases, the official’s 
actions are motivated by a desire to enhance prison security. The third 
scenario seems, on its face, less extreme than the other two—so we might 
think of it as a mere administrative measure rather than an additional 
punishment.4 But before deciding, we might want to know more about 
conditions at the new facility. If they are sufficiently harsh, the reassignment 
might also start to look like an additional punishment. 
These examples illustrate two things. First, the most important factor in 
determining the line between punishments and nonpunishments, at least 
intuitively, is penal effect. Flogging and extension of a prison sentence are 
new punishments because they inflict pain or restrict liberty well beyond 
what was authorized by the original sentence. The fact that the warden’s 
purpose might be characterized as “regulatory” rather than “penal” is not 
enough to transform these punishments into mere administrative acts. 
Second, although prison officials need discretion to protect guards and 
inmates from prison violence, this discretion does not include the power to 
impose new punishments beyond what was authorized by the offender’s 
 
 4 See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (“Confinement in any of the State’s institutions 
is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.”). 
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sentence.5 Otherwise, prison officials would have the authority to do what 
legislatures, judges, and juries may not: Impose punishment without law.6 
The government’s authority to impose punishments is limited by 
several constitutional provisions. The Ex Post Facto Clauses of Article I, 
Sections Nine and Ten prohibit the government from increasing an 
offender’s punishment after he commits a crime.7 The Fifth Amendment’s8 
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits punishing an offender twice for the same 
offense, and its Compelled Self-Incrimination Clause prohibits the use of 
punishment as coercion to obtain incriminating information from an 
individual.9 The Sixth Amendment prohibits punishment for conduct that is 
not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.10 And of course, the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments.11 If flogging, 
extending a prison sentence, or transferring a prisoner to a higher security 
facility constitutes punishment, then prison officials may not inflict it unless 
it was both authorized by the penal statute governing the offense of 
conviction at the time the prisoner committed the offense and imposed by 
the sentence actually given by a judge or jury. Moreover, the Fifth and Eighth 
 
 5 See infra Part I. 
 6 See infra Part II. 
 7 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9–10. 
 8 Id. amend. V. 
 9 The Supreme Court has sometimes implied that government coercion can only be considered a 
“punishment” if it is inflicted as the result of a criminal conviction. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 
430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (holding that paddling of schoolchildren did not come within scope of Eighth 
Amendment because “[a]n examination of the history of the Amendment and the decisions of this Court 
construing the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment confirms that it was designed to protect 
those convicted of crimes”). Early constitutional history suggests, however, that the term “punishment” 
was also thought to encompass practices such as pretrial torture, where pain was inflicted in order to 
obtain information. For example, during the Virginia ratification debate, George Mason, the principal 
drafter of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, asserted the following reasons for concluding that that 
document prohibited pretrial torture: “[F]or that one clause expressly provided that no man can give 
evidence against himself; and that the worthy gentleman must know that, in those countries where torture 
is used, evidence was extorted from the criminal himself. Another clause of the bill of rights provided 
that no cruel and unusual punishments shall be inflicted; therefore, torture was included in the 
prohibition.” 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 452 (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES]. Similarly, Blackstone 
described pretrial torture as a “punishment.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND 325–27 (16th ed. 1825); see also Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back 
to the Lost Origins of the Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 661, 673 (2004) (discussing historical 
evidence that the Eighth Amendment was originally understood to prohibit torture). 
 10 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 11 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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Amendments may bar certain punishments altogether, either because they 
involve an effort to force the prisoner to provide incriminating evidence or 
because they are cruel and unusual.12 
These limits apply to all three branches of government. Indeed, they 
arguably should apply with greatest force to the executive branch because it 
has strong incentives to order the infliction of punishments, but no 
independent constitutional authority to do so. Basic separation of powers 
principles dictate that only the legislature may authorize punishments and 
only the judge or the jury may impose them. Executive officials are supposed 
to implement the punishments authorized by the other branches of 
government. They do not have the authority to enhance punishments on their 
own.13 At the same time, executive officials interact with individuals more 
frequently and directly than representatives of the other branches of 
government and have strong incentives to use punishment to exert control 
over them. Thus, it is important to make sure that executive officials comply 
with the constitutional provisions summarized above. 
The Supreme Court’s modern prison conditions jurisprudence shows 
little awareness of the separation of powers principles prohibiting executive 
officials from imposing punishments on their own authority.14 Instead, the 
Court has focused on a different separation of powers problem: the need to 
prevent the judiciary from involving itself in the running of prisons. To 
decide constitutional cases without intruding upon the prerogatives of the 
other branches of government, courts need a judicially administrable 
standard of adjudication. As discussed in Part I below, the Supreme Court’s 
modern punishment-related jurisprudence notably lacks such a standard. The 
tests the Court employs for distinguishing punishments from 
nonpunishments are so vague and ambiguous that they provide little real 
guidance. Thus, the Court must either substitute its own judgment for that of 
prison officials or defer to prison officials’ constitutionally questionable 
 
 12 Because prison conditions are part of the punishment the offender receives with his sentence, the 
Eighth Amendment applies to the conditions even if the decision to place a prisoner in a certain facility 
does not constitute a separate punishment above and beyond the prisoner’s formal sentence. See, e.g., 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–06 (1976) (applying the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to 
prison conditions); see also John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441 
(2017) [hereinafter Stinneford, Original Meaning of “Cruel”] (discussing the Supreme Court’s prison-
conditions jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment). Professor Judith Resnik has recently identified 
a nascent “anti-ruination principle” tying together the various strands of the Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence over the past seventy years, including its prison-conditions case law. See 
Judith Resnik, (Un)Constitutional Punishments: Eighth Amendment Silos, Penological Purposes, and 
People’s “Ruin,” 129 YALE L.J.F. 365, 408 (2020). 
 13 See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra Part I. 
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conduct. In other words, in the absence of a clear, workable standard of 
adjudication, the Court must either violate separation of powers by taking 
over the functions of the Executive or tolerate the Executive’s violation of 
separation of powers by deferring to its decisions to inflict punishments on 
the basis of its own authority. Such tolerance also permits prison officials to 
violate individuals’ rights by imposing punishments without law. 
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has chosen to tolerate punishment 
by executive fiat. The Court has implied that once a prisoner is incarcerated, 
changes to prison conditions will not be considered punishments unless they 
are cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment—a situation that is only 
triggered, under current case law, by proof that the responsible prison official 
had a culpable state of mind.15 Even if conditions of confinement impose a 
“significant and atypical hardship” on the prisoner, they are not considered 
punishments and therefore trigger only minimal due process protection.16 
The Court’s deference to administrative discretion means that executive 
officials can easily evade constitutional restrictions on the infliction of 
punishment. 
An examination of English and American constitutional history 
demonstrates three facts that are relevant to this situation. First, the need to 
limit the government’s discretion over punishment has been a central theme 
of English and American constitutionalism from the Magna Carta through 
the adoption of the American Bill of Rights. Second, executive officials’ 
exercise of undue discretion over punishment has been recognized for 
centuries as a central attribute of arbitrary and tyrannical government. Third, 
the core standard for distinguishing between punishments and 
nonpunishments is penal effect viewed in light of tradition. If a government 
action has traditionally been used as a punishment or imposes pain or 
deprivation equivalent to a method traditionally used as a punishment, it is a 
punishment for constitutional purposes regardless of the label the 
government attaches to it.17 
 
 15 See infra Part I. 
 16 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005); see also infra Section I.B. Moving the 
analysis from the “punishment” question to the “due process” question has not solved the problem arising 
from the Court’s lack of an administrable standard for differentiating punishments from nonpunishments, 
for the Court also lacks an administrable standard for determining which inflictions of pain or deprivations 
of liberty within prison trigger due process protection. See, e.g., Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223 (noting the 
courts lack a “baseline from which to measure what [deprivation] is atypical and significant in any 
particular prison system”). 
 17 This is not to say that the reasons for the imposition are unimportant. If the government imposes a 
deprivation that has traditionally been used for nonpenal as well as penal reasons, the purpose of the 
deprivation may tell us whether or not the deprivation is punishment. For example, denial of the right to 
practice law has traditionally been imposed for nonpenal reasons—failure to pass the bar exam, failure to 
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The Supreme Court’s older case law reflects these principles. In 1890, 
the Court held, in a case called In re Medley,18 that the transfer of a 
condemned offender from a county jail to solitary confinement in a 
penitentiary prior to execution was a new punishment for constitutional 
purposes.  The Court reached this conclusion for two related reasons: solitary 
confinement was historically used as a heightened form of punishment, and 
it inflicted substantial suffering beyond what is normally imposed by a prison 
sentence.19 The fact that the government’s purpose in imposing solitary 
confinement on Medley was regulatory rather than penal was irrelevant to 
the Court’s analysis. Medley is still good law and answers the question posed 
by this Essay: Solitary confinement is a punishment—not a mere exercise of 
administrative discretion—and is thus subject to the constitutional 
constraints listed above. 
Part I describes the Supreme Court’s existing case law governing prison 
officials’ discretion to impose harsher conditions on inmates. Part II analyzes 
English and American constitutional history relating to the need to limit 
discretion over punishment, the danger of executive discretion in the 
infliction of punishment, and the distillation of a standard relevant to 
conditions of confinement. Finally, Part III checks the accuracy of the 
Supreme Court’s conclusion in Medley that the harshness of solitary 
confinement makes it a new punishment by examining historical and modern 
empirical data relating to the effects of solitary confinement and concludes 
that the Medley Court was correct. 
I. THE DOMINANCE OF DISCRETION: CURRENT APPROACHES TO 
PUNISHMENT AND DUE PROCESS 
Current Supreme Court doctrine governing conditions of confinement 
focuses almost exclusively on the need to respect the discretionary decisions 
of prison officials and focuses little on the need to constrain this discretion 
by law. This deferential approach stems from the Court’s failure to identify 
a workable, coherent definition of “punishment,” which has led to an 
 
meet character and fitness requirements, etc. But if the government imposes this deprivation in order to 
punish a person for prior conduct, it is a punishment for constitutional purposes. See Ex parte Garland, 
71 U.S. 333, 377 (1867). The government’s purpose is also important in determining whether a 
punishment is justified and proportionate to the offense. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison 
Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 
89 MINN. L. REV. 571 (2005); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 
91 VA. L. REV. 677 (2005); John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899 (2011) [hereinafter Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality]. 
 18 134 U.S. 160 (1890). 
 19 Id. at 173. 
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inability to develop a standard to differentiate permissible from 
impermissible exercises of discretion over conditions of confinement. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Failure to Define “Punishment” 
The Supreme Court has not adopted a clear, consistent standard for 
determining whether conditions imposed by prison officials constitute an 
additional punishment beyond what has been authorized by penal statute and 
judicial sentence. Instead, it has adopted at least two different standards, one 
of which is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the Constitution’s text, 
and the other of which is largely incoherent. 
The Court’s first definition of punishment, which it employs in Eighth 
Amendment cases, comes from its decision in Wilson v. Seiter.20 In that case, 
a prisoner brought a lawsuit claiming that certain prison conditions—namely 
“overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient locker storage space, 
inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and 
inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation, and 
housing with mentally and physically ill inmates”21—constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment. The Supreme Court held that such conditions amount 
to a punishment only if the prison official responsible for them displayed a 
“wanton” or “culpable” state of mind.22 Such wantonness or culpability could 
be shown by establishing a prison official’s “deliberate indifference”23 to a 
prisoner’s well-being, or that the official acted “maliciously and sadistically 
for the very purpose of causing harm.”24 
The requirement that responsible prison officials must be shown to have 
a culpable state of mind might make sense as a standard for determining 
which punishments are “cruel,”25 but not as a means of distinguishing 
punishments from nonpunishments. Indeed, this standard seems flatly 
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the word “punishment.” Webster’s 
1828 dictionary, for example, defines “punishment” as “[a]ny pain or 
suffering inflicted on a person for a crime or offense, by the authority to 
which the offender is subject, either by the constitution of God or of civil 
 
 20 501 U.S. 294 (1991). 
 21 Id. at 296. 
 22 Id. at 299, 302, 305 (emphasis omitted). 
 23 Id. at 302 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 
 24 Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986)). 
 25 As I have demonstrated elsewhere, however, this would be an incorrect standard as a matter of 
original meaning. See Stinneford, Original Meaning of “Cruel,” supra note 12; see also Samuel L. Bray, 
“Necessary AND Proper” and “Cruel AND Unusual”: Hendiadys in the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 
687, 717 (2016) (arguing that “cruel and unusual” is a hendiadys—that is, a multiword phrase with a 
single, complex meaning—but agreeing that it does not refer to the mental state of the punisher). 
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society.”26 Similarly, Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary defines 
punishment, in relevant part, as “suffering, pain, or loss that serves as 
retribution,” “a penalty inflicted on an offender through judicial procedure,” 
or “severe, rough, or disastrous treatment.”27 As these older and newer 
dictionary definitions imply, punishment involves intent to inflict pain or 
suffering, but not necessarily culpable intent. Moreover, once we consider 
punishment outside the context of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause, the culpability requirement loses even its surface appeal. What does 
a government official’s culpability have to do with the question of whether 
a prisoner is suffering an ex post facto punishment, or double jeopardy, or 
deprivation of the right to a jury trial? 
The other test the Court sometimes uses to distinguish punishments 
from nonpunishments was first articulated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez,28 and was applied to prison conditions for pretrial detainees in Bell 
v. Wolfish29 and United States v. Salerno.30 The question in Mendoza-
Martinez was whether a statute that stripped citizenship from certain draft 
dodgers imposed a punishment within the meaning of the Constitution.31 To 
answer this question, the Court set forth the following multifactor test: (1) 
whether the sanction imposes “an affirmative disability or restraint”; (2) 
whether the sanction “has historically been regarded as a punishment”; (3) 
whether the sanction “comes into play only on a finding of scienter”; (4) 
whether the sanction “promote[s] the traditional aims of punishment—
retribution and deterrence”; (5) whether the sanction applies to behavior that 
is “already a crime”; (6) whether the sanction is “rationally connected” to a 
possible “alternative purpose”; and (7) whether the sanction “appears 
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose.”32 
This test is confusing and amorphous. The Court does not specify how 
the factors relate to each other, nor how they are supposed to reveal whether 
a government action is a punishment. Nonetheless, there is an implicit logical 
relationship between the test’s seven factors. The first two focus on the 
government action itself: Does the action have a penal effect, and is it the 
sort of action that has historically been used as punishment? The remaining 
factors focus on the government’s purpose in taking the action: Is it directed 
 
 26 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, S. 
Converse 1828). 
 27 Punishment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/punishment? 
utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld [https://perma.cc/DKQ9-579G]. 
 28 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
 29 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
 30 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 31 372 U.S. at 165–66. 
 32 Id. at 168–69. 
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only at culpable actors? (Factors 3 and 5.) Does the government label the 
action as penal or regulatory? (Factors 4 and 6.) If the government labels the 
action as regulatory, is this labeling plausible in light of the action’s effect? 
(Factors 6 and 7.) 
When one examines the precedents underlying the Mendoza-Martinez 
factors, it becomes clear that a government-imposed sanction is a 
punishment if it has a clear penal effect, and that questions about the 
government’s purpose in imposing a sanction only arise when the sanction 
is also often used for nonpenal purposes. Every case cited in support of the 
factors relating to government purpose (factors 3 through 7) involved a type 
of deprivation that has historically been imposed for regulatory purposes. 
Seven of the nine cases involved monetary deprivations labeled as taxes, 
customs duties, denial of social security benefits, or contractual liquidated 
damages provisions.33 The two remaining cases involved “status” 
deprivations—disqualification from public office34 and denationalization35—
that are often imposed for regulatory purposes. States routinely impose 
regulatory requirements that must be met before a person can hold public 
office, and the exclusion of those who fail to meet these requirements is not 
generally regarded as a punishment. Similarly, as a plurality of the Supreme 
Court noted in Trop v. Dulles, the federal government generally 
denaturalizes citizens who falsified their citizenship applications “not . . . to 
penalize the alien for having falsified his application for citizenship” but “in 
the exercise of the power to make rules for the naturalization of aliens.”36 
It is not a coincidence that the precedents supporting factors 3 through 
7 involve deprivations that have historically been imposed for regulatory 
purposes. In order to determine whether such a deprivation is actually a 
punishment, the Court must consider evidence that the deprivation’s true 
purpose is not what it appears to be. Factors 3 through 7 identify the kinds 
of evidence relevant to this inquiry. But if the deprivation is of the sort that 
has historically been imposed as punishment, there is no need to look for 
evidence of purpose. The penal effect itself is sufficient to qualify the 
 
 33 See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (termination of social security benefits); Rex Trailer 
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956) (contractual liquidated damages provision); United States v. 
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935) (excise tax on liquor); United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931) 
(tax on retail liquor business); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922) (“tax” on unlawful liquor sales); 
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (child labor tax); Helwig v. 
United States, 188 U.S. 605 (1903) (customs charge). 
 34 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867). 
 35 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 36 Id. at 98. 
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deprivation as punishment.37 Thus, a court examining whether a government-
imposed deprivation is actually a punishment should engage in a two-step 
inquiry. First it should ask whether the action has traditionally been used as 
a punishment or imposes pain or deprivation equivalent to a method 
traditionally used as a punishment. If the answer to this question is no, the 
court should use factors 3 through 7 to determine whether the action has been 
imposed for punitive purposes. If the answer is yes, there is no need to 
inquire into the government’s purpose. 
The Supreme Court in recent decades has generally skipped the first 
step of this inquiry and focused solely on evidence relating to a given 
sanction’s purpose. The Court has also increasingly deferred to the label the 
government attaches to the sanction at the expense of other types of 
evidence. For example, in Bell v. Wolfish,38 the Court considered whether 
prison conditions such as double-bunking and restrictions on the receipt of 
books, food, and other packages counted as unconstitutional punishment of 
pretrial detainees. In answering this question, the Court focused almost 
exclusively on factor 6: whether there was a rational relationship between 
the challenged restrictions on liberty and the asserted nonpunitive purpose 
of the restrictions.39 The Court minimized the liberty interest at stake and 
emphasized the need to defer to the expertise of prison administrators. 
Because detainees were already in prison, and were thus already subject to 
intrusions on their privacy and restrictions on their liberty, these increases in 
the level of intrusion were not sufficient to raise constitutional concerns.40 
Moreover, respect for separation of powers dictated that the Court give 
deference to prison officials’ expertise concerning the measures necessary to 
preserve security.41 The Supreme Court observed that courts should not be in 
the business of running prisons.42 Thus, it concluded that the restrictions 
placed on pretrial detainees did not constitute punishment because they were 
rationally related to the goal of protecting prison security.43 
 
 37 See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (sixty-day imprisonment at hard 
labor); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890) (imposition of solitary confinement). These cases are discussed 
in greater depth in Section II.C. 
 38 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
 39 Id. at 538–39. 
 40 Id. at 546 (“A detainee simply does not possess the full range of freedoms of an unincarcerated 
individual.”). 
 41 Id. at 547 (“Prison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption 
and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and 
discipline and to maintain institutional security.”). 
 42 See id. at 548. 
 43 See id. at 555. 
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In United States v. Salerno,44 the Supreme Court made its deference to 
government labeling more explicit. It asserted that unless the government 
labels its action as a punishment, the action will be considered a nonpenal 
regulation so long as it has a rational relationship to a nonpenal purpose and 
is not excessive in relation to that purpose.45 Thus, it held that pretrial 
detention on grounds of dangerousness was not a punishment because 
Congress labeled this detention as nonpenal and because such detention was 
rationally related to the goal of protecting the community.46 The Supreme 
Court later used similar reasoning to hold that indefinite detention of persons 
considered sexually dangerous was not a punishment and thus not subject to 
the various limits stated in the Constitution.47 
B. The Minimal Due Process Approach 
As the cases discussed above demonstrate, outside the context of an 
Eighth Amendment claim, the Supreme Court strongly defers to the label the 
government attaches to a given deprivation or infliction. If the government 
labels a sanction as nonpenal, the Court generally accepts the label. The cases 
discussed below demonstrate that the Supreme Court will sometimes analyze 
these nonpunishments under the Due Process Clause, but only in extreme 
cases—and even then, it provides far less procedural and substantive 
protection than is required by the constitutional provisions that govern the 
infliction of punishment. 
The Supreme Court’s reluctance to interfere with prison officials’ 
decisions concerning conditions of confinement is evident in three cases 
involving imposition of solitary confinement: Hutto v. Finney,48 Sandin v. 
Conner,49 and Wilkinson v. Austin.50 
In Hutto v. Finney,51 the Supreme Court upheld a district court’s 
determination that the Arkansas prison system’s use of punitive isolation was 
a cruel and unusual punishment.52 The conditions of isolation were 
particularly egregious—numerous prisoners were crowded into a single cell 
 
 44 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 45 See id. at 747. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997). 
 48 437 U.S. 678 (1978). 
 49 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 
 50 545 U.S. 209 (2005). 
 51 437 U.S. 678. 
 52 Id. at 680–81. 
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and subjected to malnourishment and exposure to infectious diseases.53 But 
even as the Court condemned these conditions, it implied that prison officials 
have the authority to impose long-term solitary confinement so long as they 
provide for the physical needs of the offender: “If new conditions of 
confinement are not materially different from those affecting other prisoners, 
a transfer [to punitive isolation] for the duration of a prisoner’s sentence 
might be completely unobjectionable and well within the authority of the 
prison administrator.”54 
The Supreme Court confirmed prison officials’ discretion to send 
prisoners to solitary confinement in Sandin v. Conner.55 In that case, an 
inmate named Conner cursed at a prison guard during a highly intrusive strip 
search.56 As a result, the prison conducted a disciplinary hearing pursuant to 
prison regulations but refused to allow Conner to present witnesses.57 Conner 
was sentenced to thirty days of “disciplinary segregation” in solitary 
confinement.58 During this period, Conner “had to spend his entire time alone 
in his cell (with the exception of 50 minutes each day on average for brief 
exercise and shower periods, during which he nonetheless remained isolated 
from other inmates and was constrained by leg irons and waist chains).”59 By 
contrast, if he had not been placed in disciplinary segregation, Conner 
“would have left his cell and worked, taken classes, or mingled with others 
for eight hours each day.”60 Thus, Conner argued that the denial of his request 
to present witnesses at his disciplinary hearing violated his right to due 
process.61 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the government’s purpose in 
sending Conner to solitary confinement was “punitive”62 but held that the 
Due Process Clause was not implicated because such confinement did not 
implicate any “liberty interest.”63 A liberty interest might be implicated if 
prison officials impose a constraint that “exceed[s] the sentence in such an 
unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause 
of its own force”—for example, transfer to a mental hospital or coercive 
 
 53 Id. at 682–83. 
 54 Id. at 686. 
 55 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 
 56 Id. at 475. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 475–76. 
 59 Id. at 494 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 476 (majority opinion). 
 62 Id. at 485. 
 63 Id. at 486. 
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administration of a psychotropic drug.64 Such interests might also be 
implicated if the state “create[s]” liberty interests by giving prisoners certain 
rights—such as the right to “good time” credits—and then takes them away 
from a particular prisoner without adequate procedures.65 But the latter 
situation only gives rise to due process concerns if the deprivation “imposes 
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life.”66 The Supreme Court held that the Due Process 
Clause did not apply of its own force in this case because “[d]iscipline by 
prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the 
expected [parameters] of the sentence imposed by a court of law.”67 
Moreover, the Court held, Conner’s sentence to solitary confinement “did 
not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State 
might conceivably create a liberty interest.”68 This was so because the 
conditions of disciplinary segregation “mirrored” those of “administrative 
segregation and protective custody” and because inmates in the general 
population were confined to their cells for twelve to sixteen hours per day.69 
The Supreme Court returned to this question ten years later in Wilkinson 
v. Austin.70 That case concerned the procedures necessary to assign a prisoner 
to indefinite solitary confinement in a “supermax” facility known as the Ohio 
State Penitentiary (OSP).71 As in Conner, prisoners were given notice and an 
opportunity to rebut the case against them before being assigned to solitary 
confinement, but were not allowed to present their own witnesses.72 Thus, 
they claimed that the procedure violated their right to due process.73 The 
Court decided that the differences between the indefinite solitary 
confinement at issue in this case and the disciplinary segregation at issue in 
Conner were sufficient to create “an atypical and significant hardship,” thus 
implicating a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause: 
For an inmate placed in OSP, almost all human contact is prohibited, even to 
the point that conversation is not permitted from cell to cell; the light, though it 
may be dimmed, is on for 24 hours; exercise is for 1 hour per day, but only in a 
 
 64 See id. at 484 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) (transfer to mental hospital); 
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990) (coercive administration of a psychotropic drug)). 
 65 Id. at 477–78 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974)). 
 66 Id. at 484. 
 67 Id. at 485. 
 68 Id. at 486. 
 69 Id. at 486 & n.8. 
 70 545 U.S. 209 (2005). 
 71 Id. at 213. 
 72 Id. at 216. 
 73 Id. at 218. 
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small indoor room. Save perhaps for the especially severe limitations on all 
human contact, these conditions likely would apply to most solitary 
confinement facilities, but here there are two added components. First is the 
duration. Unlike the 30-day placement in [Conner], placement at OSP is 
indefinite and, after an initial 30-day review, is reviewed just annually. Second 
is that placement disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for parole 
consideration.74 
Nonetheless, as in Conner, the Austin Court upheld the decision to send 
the prisoner to indefinite solitary confinement.75 The Court held that 
prisoners had a reduced liberty interest because they were already 
incarcerated76 and that the State’s interest in security was “dominant” 
because of the threat posed by prison gangs.77 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Hutto, Conner, and Austin show that 
the Court lacks a meaningful standard for determining whether the 
imposition of solitary confinement constitutes an additional punishment or 
even a mere deprivation of liberty. The Hutto and Conner decisions imply 
that every sentence of incarceration includes authorization to subject 
prisoners to solitary confinement.78 The Austin Court expresses some 
discomfort with this idea but ultimately affirms prison officials’ broad 
authority to impose even indefinite solitary confinement on prisoners.79 
These decisions show relatively little awareness of the extreme degree of 
additional suffering that solitary confinement inflicts on prisoners. This 
suffering will be discussed in Part III. 
II. HISTORICAL LIMITS ON PUNISHMENT DISCRETION 
This Part provides a brief overview of three aspects of English and 
American constitutional history: first, the development of procedural and 
substantive doctrines to limit the government’s discretion over the 
imposition of punishment and thus minimize the risk of punishment without 
law; second, recognition of the dangers to liberty that arise from executive 
discretion over punishment; and third, the distillation in the nineteenth 
century of a standard for differentiating punishments from nonpunishments, 
focusing on penal effect in light of tradition. 
 
 74 Id. at 223–24. 
 75 Id. at 213. 
 76 Id. at 225. 
 77 Id. at 227 (“Prison security, imperiled by the brutal reality of prison gangs, provides the backdrop 
of the State’s interest. Clandestine, organized, fueled by race-based hostility, and committed to fear and 
violence as a means of disciplining their own members and their rivals, gangs seek nothing less than to 
control prison life and to extend their power outside prison walls.”). 
 78 See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485–86 (1995); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978). 
 79 See 545 U.S. at 213, 225–27. 
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A. Constitutional Doctrines Limiting Punishment Discretion 
Of all governmental powers, the power to punish may be the most 
susceptible to abuse. If one wishes to enhance one’s power, eliminate one’s 
enemies, or simply demonstrate that one is in control, the easiest and most 
straightforward way to accomplish these goals is often the whip, the prison, 
or the gallows. For this reason, much of English constitutional history can be 
seen as a struggle between a power holder (whether it be king, judge, or 
Parliament) seeking to exercise unconstrained power to punish and others 
seeking to enforce common law limits on this power. These discretion-
constraining common law doctrines were later adopted by the drafters of the 
United States Constitution and written into its original text or the Bill of 
Rights. Because I have limited space, I will provide only a brief overview of 
these principles and doctrines. 
English common law doctrines enforcing the nulla poena principle 
were both substantive and procedural in nature. They are addressed in turn 
below. 
1. No Punishment for Conduct Not Prohibited by Law at the  
Time It Occurred 
In England, the nulla poena principle dates back at least to Magna 
Carta. The thirteenth-century conflicts between King John and his barons led 
to a settlement in which he agreed to abide by customary limits on royal 
power, including the famous promise: “No Free-man shall be taken, or 
imprisoned, or dispossessed, of his free tenement, or liberties, or free 
customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed; nor will we 
condemn him, nor will we commit him to prison, excepting by the legal 
judgment of his peers, or by the laws of the land.”80 This promise reflected 
the idea that the king’s power to punish was limited by law. By the 
seventeenth century, common law thinkers like Edward Coke identified this 
 
 80 The Third Great Charter of King Henry the Third (Richard Thomson trans., 1829) (1225), 
reprinted in THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY: MAGNA CARTA, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, AND THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN TRADITION OF RULE OF LAW 335, 347–48 (Ellis Sandoz ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2008). The 
full text of the provision in the original Latin is “nullus liber homo decetero capiatur vel imprisonetur aut 
disseisiatur de aliquo libero tenemento suo vel libertatibus vel liberis consuetudinibus suis, aut utlagetur, 
aut exuletur aut aliquo alio modo destruatur, nec super eum ibimus, nec super eum mittemus, nisi per 
legale judicium parium suorum, vel per legem terre.” Id. at 340 (emphasis omitted); see also Claire Breay 
& Julian Harrison, Magna Carta in Context, BRITISH LIBRARY (July 28, 2014), https://www.bl.uk/magna-
carta/articles/magna-carta-in-context [https://perma.cc/7VHA-C6XJ] (describing historical and legal 
issues that gave rise to the Magna Carta). 
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passage from Magna Carta as the source of the requirement that life, liberty, 
or property could not be taken without due process.81 
The idea that the government may not inflict punishment for conduct 
that does not violate preexisting law is reflected in the traditional common 
law prohibition of ex post facto punishments.82 English rulers did not always 
honor this principle, of course, but when they violated it they were ultimately 
condemned as acting unconstitutionally. For example, English monarchs 
created prerogative courts, such as the Court of Star Chamber, in part to 
evade procedural and substantive limits to government power generally 
respected by common law courts.83 The Court of Star Chamber’s penchant 
for punishing those who had not violated preexisting law led Parliament not 
only to abolish it but to condemn it on the ground that it had “undertaken to 
punish where no law doth warrant, and to make decrees for things having no 
such authority, and to inflict heavier punishments than by any law is 
warranted . . . . [Such judgment had proven] to be an intolerable burden to 
the subjects, and the means to introduce an arbitrary power and 
government.”84 
Notice that in this statute, Parliament criticizes the Court of Star 
Chamber not only for violating substantive rights, but also for ignoring 
structural limits to its own power. The Court of Star Chamber abused its 
power by inflicting punishments either unauthorized by law or heavier than 
authorized by law, and also by issuing decrees it had no authority to issue. 
This statute was later interpreted as condemning the court’s refusal to follow 
established common law procedures designed to protect the rights of 
defendants and as requiring that any new courts of justice established by the 
king “must proceed according to the old established forms of the common 
 
 81 See EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50 (6th 
ed. 1681). 
 82 The prohibition of ex post facto punishments is reflected in a story recounted by Blackstone 
concerning the Russian ambassador to England during the reign of Queen Anne. The ambassador was 
apparently a profligate spender who ran up debts he could not pay back. Ultimately, one of his creditors 
had him arrested and imprisoned for debt. When the Czar learned of this, he angrily demanded that the 
creditor be executed for his effrontery. “But the queen (to the amazement of that despotic court) directed 
her secretary to inform him, ‘that she could inflict no punishment upon any, the meanest, of her subjects, 
unless warranted by the law of the land: and, therefore, was persuaded that he would not insist upon 
impossibilities.” 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, 
TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 254–55 (1803) [hereinafter 1 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE]. 
 83 See, e.g., F.W. MAITLAND, SELECTED HISTORICAL ESSAYS OF F.W. MAITLAND 127–30 (Helen M. 
Cam ed., 1957). 
 84 The Habeas Corpus Act 1640, 16 Car. c. 10 (Eng.).  
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law.”85 By insisting that the government can only inflict punishments in a 
manner that protects substantive rights, follows established procedures, and 
respects structural limitations of government power, Parliament sought to 
prevent future efforts “to introduce an arbitrary power and government.”86 
2. No Use of Punishments That Are Harsher than the Common Law 
Permits 
As noted above, one of the grounds for condemning the Court of Star 
Chamber was that it inflicted punishments that were heavier than the law 
authorized. Even if the law permits punishment for a given offense, it also 
limits the punishments that may be inflicted for that offense. To the extent 
punishment exceeds legal limits, it is a punishment without law. This 
limitation on government power showed itself in two primary contexts under 
the English constitution: the absolute prohibition of torture and the 
requirement that punishment be proportionate to the offense. 
One of the ways prerogative courts differed from common law courts 
was that at least some of them used continental civil law practices such as 
torture to extract confessions from criminal defendants.87 From the time 
English monarchs first introduced this practice, common lawyers argued that 
it was illegal.88 Ultimately, the Court of King’s Bench declared in Felton’s 
Case in 1628 that torture was prohibited because “no such punishment is 
known or allowed by our law.”89 
The requirement that punishment be proportionate to the offense may 
be seen in Parliament’s condemnation of the Court of Star Chamber for 
inflicting heavier punishments than the law permits for a given offense. It 
 
 85 1 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at 142. 
 86 The Habeas Corpus Act 1640, 16 Car. c. 10 (Eng.).  
 87 See, e.g., Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted”: The Original 
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 848 (1969) (describing the Court of High Commission’s use of torture); 
see also EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1644), 
reprinted in 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 944, 1025 (Steve 
Sheppard ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2003) (claiming that the first step toward introducing civil law judicial 
process into England was the placement of a torture device—the rack—in the Tower of London). 
 88 See, e.g., JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE: A TREATISE IN COMMENDATION OF 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 73 (Francis Gregor trans., Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co. 1874) (1470) 
(condemning torture as “[a] practice so inhuman deserves not indeed to be called a law, but the high road 
to hell”); see also EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 35 
(15th ed. 1797) (“[T]here is no law to warrant tortures in this land . . . . And there is no one opinion in 
our books[] or judicial[] record (that we have [s]een and remember) for the maintenance of tortures or 
torments . . . .”). 
 89 3 T.B. HOWELL, Proceedings Against John Felton for the Murder of the Duke of Buckingham, in 
A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER 
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, at 369 (1628). 
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may be seen even more clearly in the prohibition of excessive fines and cruel 
and unusual punishments in the English Bill of Rights. As I have shown 
elsewhere, the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments was directed not 
only at inherently cruel methods of punishment such as torture, but also at 
punishments that are cruelly disproportionate to the offense in light of long-
standing prior practice.90 
The proportionality requirement may also be seen in rules governing 
conditions of confinement while prisoners await trial. Blackstone wrote that 
because pretrial prisoners were held “only for safe custody, and not for 
punishment,”91 they “ought to be used with the utmost humanity; and neither 
be loaded with needless fetters, or subjected to other hardships than such as 
are absolutely requisite for the purpose of confinement only.”92 He lamented, 
however, that conditions of confinement “must too often be left to the 
discretion of the gaolers[,] who are frequently a merciless race of men, and, 
by being conversant in scenes of misery, steeled against any tender 
sensation.”93 To protect against abuse of this discretion, Parliament enacted 
laws making gaolers liable to punishment for engaging in extortionate or 
abusive conduct,94 and for neglecting the health and sanitation of the 
prisoners.95 In short, if a restriction on liberty is not itself a punishment, the 
jailer must be careful not to inflict greater restrictions or pain than are 
necessary, for any additional pain or restriction would be a punishment 
without law. 
3. Protection of Common Law Procedural Rights 
Common law criminal procedures were also designed to prevent the 
imposition of wrongful punishment. These procedures included the right to 
indictment by grand jury, to jury trial in the vicinage of the offense, to 
confront witnesses, and to seek a writ of habeas corpus. Such procedures 
limited the power of the government to punish, either by requiring a finding 
by citizens that punishment was warranted, or by permitting the defendant to 
challenge the basis of the government’s case, or by providing that a judge 
may review the lawfulness of a person’s incarceration. 
The nulla poena principle was also reflected in jurisdictional rules 
designed to limit judicial discretion at sentencing. For example, as 
 
 90 Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 17, at 932–38. 
 91 4 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE 
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 300 (1803) [hereinafter 4 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE]. 
 92 Id.  
 93 Id. 
 94 Debtors Imprisonment Act 1758, 32 Geo. 2 c. 28, § XI (Eng.). 
 95 Health of Prisoners Act 1774, 14 Geo. 3 c. 59 (Eng.). 
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Blackstone explains, courts of equity were prohibited from exercising 
jurisdiction in criminal cases because of the risk they would use their 
equitable powers to impose more punishment than was permissible by law: 
For the freedom of our constitution will not permit, that in criminal cases a 
power should be lodged in any judge, to construe the law otherwise than 
according to the letter . . . . A man cannot suffer more punishment than the law 
assigns, but he may suffer less. The laws cannot be strained by partiality to 
inflict a penalty beyond what the letter will warrant; but, in cases where the 
letter induces any apparent hardship, the crown has the power to pardon.96 
4. Strict Separation of Powers 
The common law also required a strict separation of powers in the 
imposition and execution of punishments. According to Blackstone, for 
example, only a judge could order the execution of a man found guilty of 
murder, and he could only do so when acting upon the basis of a lawful 
commission.97 The execution order could only be carried out by the proper 
officer or his deputy.98 Finally—and most importantly for our purposes—the 
officer had no discretion to change the ordered method of execution (for 
example, from beheading to hanging, or vice versa): “[F]or he is merely 
ministerial, and therefore only justified when he acts under the authority and 
compulsion of the law . . . .”99 If anyone violated any of these rules, he would 
himself be guilty of murder.100 Even the king lacked the authority to 
substitute one method of execution for another, because this would be 
imposition of a new punishment—although he could remit part of the 
sentence.101 
5. American Adoption of English Common Law Limits on 
Punishment Discretion 
Americans of the Founding Era were at least as concerned about 
constraining governmental punishment discretion as were English common 
law thinkers.102 They were acutely aware of the historical struggles to 
constrain this discretion, and were determined not to permit the same abuses 
 
 96 1 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at 92. 
 97 See id. at 178–79. 
 98 See id. 
 99 Id. at 179. 
 100 See id. at 178–79. 
 101 See id. at 179. 
 102 For a detailed discussion of American efforts to constrain governmental power within common 
law limits during the revolutionary and founding periods, see John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning 
of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1792–
1810 (2008) [hereinafter Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”]. 
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that had occurred in England.103 For example, when England tried to give an 
Admiralty Court criminal jurisdiction over American colonists, Americans 
protested that because the Admiralty Court used the civil law procedures, it 
was comparable to the Court of Star Chamber. As John Adams wrote: “Can 
you recollect the complaints and clamors, which were sounded with such 
industry, and supported by such a profusion of learning in law and history, 
and such invincible reasoning . . . against the Star-Chamber and High 
Commission, and yet remain an advocate for the newly-formed courts of 
admiralty in America?”104 
Similarly, Anti-Federalists opposed ratification of the United States 
Constitution on the ground that it did not require Congress to provide 
traditional common law protections to criminal defendants.105 Patrick Henry 
noted, for example, that although criminal courts of equity were forbidden 
in England, “[Congress] will tell you that there is such a necessity of 
strengthening the arm of government, that they must have a criminal equity, 
and extort confession by torture, in order to punish with still more relentless 
severity. We are then lost and undone.”106 
Indeed, many of the rights listed in the original constitutional text and 
the Bill of Rights were specifically designed to limit the government’s 
discretionary power to punish.107 These include the right to trial by jury in 
the state and vicinage of the offense;108 habeas corpus;109 prohibitions of ex 
post facto laws and bills of attainder;110 the right to indictment by grand 
 
 103 See id. at 1798. 
 104 John Adams, The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym, BOS. GAZETTE (Supp.), Jan. 13, 1766, 
reprinted in 3 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR, NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 469–70 (Boston, Charles C. 
Little & James Brown 1851). 
 105 See, e.g., GEORGE MASON, OBJECTIONS TO THIS CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT (1787), 
reprinted in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 637 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
(“There is no Declaration of Rights, and the laws of the general government being paramount to the laws 
and constitution of the several States, the Declaration of Rights in the separate States are no security. Nor 
are the people secured even in the enjoyment of the benefit of the common law (which stands here upon 
no other foundation than its having been adopted by the respective acts forming the constitutions of the 
several States).”). 
 106 Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention for the United States Constitution 
(June 9, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 9, at 448. 
 107 The Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution largely to answer the Anti-Federalist critique 
that the original constitutional text did not provide sufficient common law constraints on the power of the 
federal government. See, e.g., ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776–1791, 
at 171–75 (rev. ed. 1983); Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual,”supra note 102, at 1800–08. 
 108 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; id. art. III, § 2. 
 109 Id. art. I, § 9. 
 110 Id. art. I, §§ 9–10. 
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jury;111 the prohibition of double jeopardy;112 the prohibition of compelled 
self-incrimination;113 the right to due process of law;114 the right to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;115 the right to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him;116 the right to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor;117 the right to have the assistance 
of counsel;118 and the prohibition of excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel 
and unusual punishments.119 
Like its English counterpart, American law required that even where a 
decision-maker has discretion as to the type or quantity of punishment, such 
discretion must have legal limits.120 For example, the defendant in 
Commonwealth v. Wyatt121 was convicted of operating an illegal gaming 
table122 and appealed his conviction on the ground that the criminal statute 
authorized the judge to inflict a cruel and unusual punishment.123 The statute 
provided that a defendant could be imprisoned for up to six months and 
“shall moreover be punished with stripes, at the discretion of the Court, to 
be inflicted at one time, or at different times during such confinement, as 
such Court may direct, provided the same do not exceed thirty-nine at any 
one time.”124 Wyatt argued that “the Court, by virtue of this Law, might 
exercise its discretion to subserve vindictive passions, and so as to direct the 
party convicted to be subjected to thirty-nine stripes every day of the six 
months, which would inevitably terminate in death; a death produced by the 
most cruel torture.”125 The General Court of Virginia rejected this argument, 
noting that the discretion authorized under this statute was “of the same 
character with the discretion always exercised by Common Law Courts to 
inflict fine and imprisonment, and subject to be restrained by the same 
 
 111 Id. amend. V. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. amend. VI. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. amend. VIII. 
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considerations.”126 If the judge abused this discretion by inflicting excessive 
floggings, he could be “impeached” for abuse of office.127 
B. The Particular Danger of Executive Discretion over Punishment 
Executive officials have strong incentives to impose punishments 
without law. A king or a president may wish to use punishment to put a stop 
to civil disorder or to dispose of political enemies. Similarly, a prison warden 
may wish to inflict punishment to establish order in the prison or to put down 
prisoners who challenge or annoy him. Historically, the constitutional 
movement to limit punishment discretion has been driven by executive 
officials’ attempts to impose punishment without law. It was King John’s 
depredations that led to Magna Carta’s requirement that punishment be 
according to the “law of the land.”128 It was the unauthorized punishments 
imposed by the Court of Star Chamber—a prerogative court composed 
largely of the king’s ministers—that led to the emphasis on common law 
rights in England and America.129 
Both English and American thinkers recognized that executive 
discretion over punishment was dangerous because it could lead so easily to 
tyranny. For example, the tendency of English kings to impose arbitrary 
imprisonment led Parliament to pass the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.130 This 
statute strengthened the ancient common law writ of habeas corpus, which 
provided for judicial review of the lawfulness of incarceration.131 Blackstone 
described the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 as an important structural limit to 
royal and executive power:  
[I]f once it were left in the power of any, the highest, magistrate to imprison 
arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought proper, (as in France it is daily 
practised by the crown) there would soon be an end of all other rights and 
 
 126 Id. at 701. 
 127 Id.; see also Ex parte Hickey, 12 Miss. (4 S. & M.) 751, 765–66 (1844) (holding that the trial 
court’s claim of inherent power to punish newspaper editor for contempt for running an article critical of 
the judge was invalid because it gave the judge unlimited power to punish). “It is a maxim of law that 
where a discretion is allowed courts in the punishment of defined offen[s]es, that discretion must be 
regulated by law. But in this instance, the law, as claimed, sets to itself no bounds, and, under the influence 
of strong passions, punishment may be inflicted to a cruel, an unusual and excessive degree.” Hickey, 
12 Miss. (4 S. & M.) at 778. 
 128 See, e.g., Breay & Harrison, supra note 80. 
 129 See, e.g., The Habeas Corpus Act 1640, 16 Car. c. 10 (Eng.); Adams, supra note 104. 
 130 See Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2 (Eng.); see also, e.g., Amanda L. Tyler, A “Second 
Magna Carta”: The English Habeas Corpus Act and the Statutory Origins of the Habeas Privilege, 
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1949 (2016) (describing the origins and significance of the Habeas Corpus Act 
of 1679). 
 131 See Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2 (Eng.). 
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immunities . . . . To bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate, 
without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, 
as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole kingdom: but 
confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his 
sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and 
therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government.132 
Similarly, Justice Joseph Story wrote that although the President’s duty 
to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” gives the President an 
important role in protecting the country’s well-being, it must not be 
construed to give him power to impose punishments:  
[W]e are not to understand[] that this clause confers on the President any new 
and substantial power to cause the laws to be faithfully executed, by any means, 
which he shall see fit to adopt, although not prescribed by the Constitution, or 
by the acts of Congress. That would be to clothe him with an absolute despotic 
power over the lives, the property, and the rights of the whole people. A 
tyrannical President might, under a pretence of this sort, punish for a crime, 
without any trial by jury, or usurp the functions of other departments of the 
government.133 
C. Penal Effect and the Line Between Punishment and Regulation 
The question of how to draw the line between punishments and 
nonpenal regulations has arisen repeatedly from the very beginning of the 
republic. In Calder v. Bull,134 for example, the Supreme Court held that a 
Connecticut statute enacted to overturn a judge’s decision disapproving a 
will was not an ex post facto law, even though it retroactively changed legal 
rules in a way that deprived the plaintiff of property, because the law did not 
impose a punishment.135 In support of this decision, Justice Samuel Chase 
wrote that an ex post facto law is: 
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and 
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every 
law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 
3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, 
 
 132 1 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at 135–36. 
 133 See JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
177–78 (1840). 
 134 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
 135 See id. at 387, 390. There has been sustained controversy from the time Calder was decided to 
today as to the correctness of its decision that the Ex Post Facto Clause only applies to criminal and not 
civil statutes. See, e.g., John Mikhail, James Wilson, Early American Land Companies, and the Original 
Meaning of “Ex Post Facto Law,” 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 79 (2019). This controversy is beyond the 
scope of the present Essay. 
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than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters 
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the 
law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict 
the offender.136 
The Calder Court held that the Connecticut law did not violate the Ex 
Post Facto Clause because it did not impose a punishment—although in 
making this decision, the Court did not define “punishment” so as to make 
the distinction between penal and nonpenal laws and practices clear. 
The distinction between punishment and regulation repeatedly arose in 
the nineteenth century in relation to the power to deport noncitizens. The 
issue was first debated after passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts in 
1798.137 These statutes were enacted during a period of heightened tensions 
between the United States and France and gave the President the authority to 
arrest and deport such noncitizens “as he shall judge dangerous to the peace 
and safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect 
are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the 
government thereof,”138 or who are male, fourteen years old or older, and 
“natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of [a] hostile nation or government” 
during a time of actual conflict.139 
The Alien and Sedition Acts generated numerous constitutional 
objections. Most notable for our purposes was the Virginia legislature’s 
complaint that the deportation provisions gave the President the power to 
impose punishments without trial, and therefore “subvert[ed] the general 
principles of free government” by “uniting legislative and judicial powers to 
those of executive.”140 In response, Congress rejected the argument that the 
Alien Acts gave the President the authority to punish without trial, arguing 
that deportation was not a punishment “but . . . merely the removal from 
motives of general safety, of an indulgence which there is danger of their 
abusing, and which we are in no manner bound to grant or continue.”141 
 
 136 Calder, 3 U.S. at 390 (emphasis omitted). 
 137 See Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798); Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798); 
Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). 
 138 Alien Friends Act, 1 Stat. 570. 
 139 Alien Enemies Act, 1 Stat. 577. 
 140 JAMES MADISON, VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF 1798, PRONOUNCING THE ALIEN AND SEDITION 
LAWS TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND DEFINING THE RIGHTS OF THE STATES (1798), reprinted in 
4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, 
at 528 (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES]. 
 141 REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE PETITIONS PRAYING FOR A REPEAL OF THE ALIEN AND 
SEDITION LAWS (1799) [hereinafter SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT], in 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2987 (1851). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
34 
James Madison replied on behalf of the Virginia legislature that deportation 
is the same thing as banishment, and that it is therefore a punishment 
regardless of whether Congress’s motives were “preventive” or “penal.”142 
Because deportation has the effect of removing a person from a country 
where he may have made a permanent home, acquired property, and 
established friends and family ties and exposing him to the dangers of travel 
at sea during a time of possible conflict, Madison argued that it must be 
classified as a punishment: “[I]f a banishment of this sort be not a 
punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to 
imagine a doom to which the name can be applied.”143 
This debate did not definitively resolve the constitutionality of the Alien 
Acts’ deportation provisions. Nonetheless, it is illuminating because both 
sides of the debate focused primarily on the question of whether deportation 
has a penal effect. The congressional Committee argued that the Acts were 
not a punishment but “merely the removal, from motives of general safety, 
of an indulgence.”144 Madison, on the other hand, asserted that deportation of 
those who may have lived here for years, formed relationships, acquired 
property, and sought citizenship is “banishment,” a traditional method of 
punishment.145 He argued that Congress may not use a punishment to achieve 
a regulatory purpose unless it complies with the Constitution’s procedural 
restrictions on the government’s power to punish. He further argued that the 
Executive should not possess independent authority to inflict punishment.146 
The issues raised by the Alien Acts arose once again nearly a century 
later in Wong Wing v. United States.147 The defendants in the case were 
Chinese citizens convicted under a law providing that any Chinese person 
found to be illegally present in the United States should be sentenced to up 
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to a year of imprisonment at hard labor followed by deportation.148 The 
defendants were convicted in a summary hearing before a commissioner149 
and sentenced to sixty days at hard labor in a house of correction before 
deportation.150 They argued that imprisonment at hard labor is an infamous 
punishment within the meaning of the Constitution, and that therefore they 
had been unconstitutionally denied their rights to indictment by grand jury 
and to a jury trial.151 The Supreme Court agreed, noting that “for more than 
a century[,] imprisonment at hard labor in the state prison or penitentiary or 
other similar institution has been considered an infamous punishment in 
England and America.”152 The fact that Congress’s purposes were regulatory 
did not prevent the statute from being subject to the constitutional limits on 
punishment: “[W]hen Congress sees fit to further promote such a policy by 
subjecting the persons of such aliens to infamous punishment at hard labor, 
or by confiscating their property, we think such legislation, to be valid, must 
provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused.”153 
The question of the line between punishment and nonpenal regulation 
also arose in the context of the late nineteenth-century trend (which persists 
to this day)154 toward housing condemned offenders awaiting execution in 
solitary confinement in the state penitentiary.155 This trend seems not to have 
been intended to further any penal purpose; rather, it appears to have been 
motivated by the desire to hide executions from public view.156 For most of 
the nineteenth century—indeed, for nearly all of history—executions were 
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conducted in the public square.157 Toward the end of the nineteenth century, 
a number of states moved executions out of the public square and behind 
prison walls.158 This move was supported by some people who believed that 
public executions coarsened public sensibility by turning death into a 
spectacle.159 But there is evidence that states were actually motivated by a 
desire to undercut the death penalty abolition movement by removing 
executions from public view and thus minimizing the emotional force of the 
abolitionist argument.160 
The Colorado statute considered by the Supreme Court in the case In re 
Medley is a good example of these new death penalty statutes.161 In 1889, 
Colorado adopted a new law governing executions in the state. The old law 
had provided that prisoners awaiting execution should be kept in a county 
jail for fifteen to twenty-five days before execution by hanging.162 Both the 
jail term and the execution were supervised by the county sheriff.163 The new 
law, by contrast, required that a prisoner sentenced to death be kept in 
solitary confinement in the state penitentiary for two to four weeks prior to 
execution.164 The execution should be “enclosed from public view within the 
walls of the penitentiary.”165 The warden had the power to set the time and 
date of the execution, but was required to keep this information “secret” from 
everyone except those people invited to witness the execution.166 These 
witnesses were also required to keep the time and date of the execution 
secret.167 All witnesses were also prohibited from divulging the details of 
what happened at the execution “beyond the statement of the fact that such 
convict was on the day in question duly executed according to law at the state 
penitentiary.”168 Thus, under the new Colorado statute, the offender was kept 
in solitary confinement in a location likely to be remote from the place of 
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crime and conviction; neither the offender nor the public was to be informed 
of the execution’s time and place; the execution took place behind prison 
walls; and the details of the execution—including, for example, the suffering 
undergone by the offender—were to be kept secret as well.169 The whole 
focus of the statute was on isolation and secrecy. 
An offender named James Medley challenged the constitutionality of 
this statute. Medley committed a murder in May of 1889, two months before 
Colorado adopted its new execution law.170 Medley was tried and convicted 
after adoption of the new execution law and was sentenced under its 
provisions.171 He challenged his conviction on the ground that the new law 
imposed an ex post facto punishment in violation of Article I, Section Ten 
of the United States Constitution.172 He argued that the imposition of solitary 
confinement in a state penitentiary—albeit only for a period of two to four 
weeks—substantially added to the pain and suffering of his execution.173 
Because the new statute imposed additional punishment, and because it was 
adopted after Medley committed his crime, it violated the constitutional 
prohibition of ex post facto punishments.174 
The Supreme Court agreed.175 It held that placing the prisoner in solitary 
confinement prior to execution added so much suffering to the execution that 
it had to be considered an additional punishment for constitutional 
purposes.176 Thus, the new statute could not be applied to a prisoner whose 
crime occurred before the statute took effect without violating the prohibition 
of ex post facto punishments.177 In reaching this decision, the Court took note 
of both England’s and America’s prior experience with solitary confinement. 
During the reign of George II, the English Parliament authorized solitary 
confinement prior to execution in order to add “further terror and [a] peculiar 
mark of infamy” to the sentence.178 But Parliament repealed this law during 
the reign of William IV because “[i]n Great Britain, as in other countries, 
public sentiment revolted against this severity.”179 Similarly, the Court noted, 
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America had experimented with solitary confinement earlier in the 
nineteenth century and found it unduly harsh: 
[E]xperience demonstrated that there were serious objections to it. A 
considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into 
a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse them, 
and others became violently insane; others, still, committed suicide; while those 
who stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did 
not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the 
community . . . . [S]ome thirty or forty years ago the whole subject attracted the 
general public attention, and its main feature of solitary confinement was found 
to be too severe.180 
Given the fact that solitary confinement was historically used as a 
heightened form of punishment, and given its extremely harsh effects, the 
Supreme Court held that it could not be considered a mere administrative 
measure. Rather, it was “an additional punishment of the most important and 
painful character.”181 Thus, Medley’s punishment violated the Ex Post Facto 
Clause, and Medley’s conviction had to be overturned—even though this 
meant that Medley would escape punishment for murder altogether.182 
In sum, the United States Constitution is designed to limit the discretion 
of government officials—including executive officials—to impose 
punishments. Under the Constitution, the line between punishments and 
nonpenal regulations is determined primarily by examining the penal effect 
of the government’s action. If the government employs a method that has 
traditionally been considered a punishment—such as banishment or 
imprisonment in a penitentiary—it is to be classified as a punishment even 
if the government’s asserted purpose is regulatory rather than penal. 
Similarly, if the government imposes conditions that increase the harshness 
of the offender’s suffering beyond what could reasonably be considered part 
of an offender’s sentence, it is a new punishment, as the Medley Court 
concluded in the context of solitary confinement. 
III. HISTORY AND EFFECTS OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
As the above discussion demonstrates, the Supreme Court’s current 
treatment of the decision to place an offender in solitary confinement as an 
administrative matter rather than a punishment conflicts directly with its 
previous holding that solitary confinement is a punishment for constitutional 
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purposes.183 Astonishingly, up to now, the Court has not shown any 
awareness of the conflict. 
Resolving this conflict is important because most states today impose 
solitary confinement without statutory authorization. According to Professor 
Alexander Reinert, only four states—Delaware, Washington, South 
Carolina, and Pennsylvania—have statutes authorizing the use of solitary 
confinement outside the context of death row, and three states—Idaho, 
Pennsylvania, and Wyoming—have statutes authorizing it for those under a 
sentence of death.184 This means that the vast majority of prisoners subjected 
to solitary confinement are sent there by prison officials without statutory 
authorization, based solely on their authority to administer prisons. If solitary 
confinement is a punishment, this conduct is unconstitutional. 
Before reaching a final conclusion concerning how to resolve this 
conflict, this Essay will look briefly at the history and effects of solitary 
confinement to determine whether the Medley Court’s findings concerning 
its extreme harshness are correct. 
A. Solitary Confinement in Nineteenth-Century America 
Solitary confinement has a long and troubled history in the United 
States. It was introduced by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century reformers 
who wished to reduce use of the death penalty, corporal punishments, and 
shaming punishments. The reformers argued that imprisonment and solitary 
confinement would operate as more effective and humane engines of 
rehabilitation.185 Some reformers believed that solitary confinement could 
transform offenders into peaceful and productive members of society by 
segregating them from harmful outside influences and providing time for 
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reflection and prayer.186 Others believed that the “terror” induced by solitary 
confinement would deter crime.187 Led by Pennsylvania and New York, a 
number of states created penitentiaries in the nineteenth century and 
amended their penal statutes to provide for imprisonment and solitary 
confinement.188 
Although solitary confinement enjoyed a period of popularity over 
several decades in the nineteenth century, it came into disrepute as its effects 
became known.189 Experience showed that solitary confinement did not serve 
to rehabilitate prisoners; rather, it destroyed them.190 Numerous cases of 
hallucination, insanity, despair, suicide, illness, and death were reported by 
prison administrators and outside observers.191 Writers such as Alexis de 
Tocqueville, Gustave Beaumont, and Charles Dickens, who observed 
prisoners subject to solitary confinement, described its effects as “fatal”192 
and “worse than any torture.”193 Thus, solitary confinement fell out of favor 
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as a method of punishment by the 1860s and largely disappeared from the 
United States by the 1870s and 1880s.194 
B. Late Twentieth-Century Resurgence of Solitary Confinement 
Long-term solitary confinement experienced a resurgence starting in 
the 1960s and 1970s before drastically accelerating with the rise of supermax 
prisons in the 1980s and 1990s.195 By 2004, forty-four states and the District 
of Columbia had joined the federal government in opening supermax 
facilities.196 According to recent estimates by the Liman Center at Yale Law 
School, more than 60,000 offenders are currently housed in solitary 
confinement.197 Of these, approximately 11,500 have spent a year or more in 
solitary, and nearly 3,000 have spent six years or more in solitary.198 
The conditions of solitary confinement vary from facility to facility, but 
the supermax unit at the Pelican Bay penitentiary in California, as described 
by the court in Madrid v. Gomez, is fairly representative.199 At the time 
Madrid was decided, most prisoners in the secure housing unit (SHU) at 
Pelican Bay were kept in total isolation, twenty-four hours per day, seven 
days per week.200 Each prisoner spent about twenty-three hours per day in a 
cell approximately the size of a parking spot.201 For about an hour each day, 
the prisoner would be let into a caged exercise area, resembling a dog run, 
where he was permitted to exercise alone.202 Meals were served through a 
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slot in the door.203 Prisoners were shackled during all interactions with 
guards.204 Any meetings with visitors were conducted through thick glass 
windows—but such visits were rare because of the prison’s isolated 
location.205 In sum, as the former warden testified, imprisonment in the SHU 
amounted to “virtual total deprivation, including, insofar as possible, 
deprivation of human contact.”206 Numerous supermax facilities share the 
characteristics described above.207 
C. Current Evidence Concerning the Effects of Solitary Confinement 
For purposes of determining whether solitary confinement is a 
punishment or a mere administrative action, the key question is this: How 
harsh are the effects of solitary confinement in comparison to the effects of 
imprisonment generally? Numerous studies of the effects of solitary 
confinement have been performed over the past forty years.208 They show 
that solitary confinement has extraordinarily harmful effects on prisoners 
subjected to it.209 More importantly for our purposes, they show that the 
harmful effects of solitary confinement are extreme, not just as an absolute 
matter, but also in comparison to the effects of imprisonment generally. 
Suffering in prison seems to follow a curve. Studies have shown that 
prisoners at the beginning of their sentence tend to experience very high 
levels of depression and anxiety.210 But these symptoms tend to recede as 
time goes on, so that several years into a term of incarceration, prisoners’ 
happiness levels generally settle somewhere near their pre-incarceration 
baseline.211 This curve corresponds to the theory of “hedonic adaptation,” 
which refers to the general human tendency to revert back to a baseline level 
of happiness after a significantly positive or negative experience.212 
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Suffering in solitary confinement follows a very different trajectory. 
Studies show that inmate well-being is significantly harmed by solitary 
confinement, and harms get worse over time.213 Effects include “extreme 
forms of psychopathology,”214 and include suicidal thoughts, hallucinations, 
perceptual distortions, violent fantasies, talking to one’s self, overall 
deterioration, mood swings, emotional flatness, chronic depression, social 
withdrawal, confused thought processes, oversensitivity to stimuli, irrational 
anger, and ruminations.215 
Compared to the symptoms displayed by prisoners subjected to 
incarceration generally, the effects of solitary are extraordinarily grave. For 
example, a recent study compared the psychological well-being of prisoners 
who had been held in the Secure Housing Unit (SHU) of the Pelican Bay 
state prison in California for ten years or more to prisoners held in the general 
population of the same prison for a comparable period of time.216 The study 
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excluded prisoners listed on the prison’s mental health caseload,217 and 
prisoners from both groups were randomly selected.218 It found that extreme 
long-term SHU prisoners reported nearly twice the number of stress-related 
trauma and isolation-related pathology symptoms as prisoners in the general 
population,219 and much greater intensity of stress, trauma, and isolation-
related pathology symptoms.220 Finally, the study found that “the prisoners 
in long-term solitary confinement were not only significantly more lonely 
than the long-term GP prisoners . . .  but also reported extremely high levels 
of loneliness rarely found anywhere in the literature.”221 Similar results have 
been found by other comparative studies.222 There is broad consensus that 
placing a prisoner in solitary has a psychological and physical impact well 
above any that a prisoner would experience in general population. 
In sum, historical and modern empirical evidence concerning the effects 
of solitary confinement strongly support the Supreme Court’s conclusion in 
In re Medley that solitary confinement is an additional punishment within 
the meaning of the United States Constitution. It causes suffering and harm 
well beyond that caused by a general sentence of imprisonment. Moreover, 
unlike the suffering caused by imprisonment generally, the suffering 
continues to intensify over time. Because solitary confinement is an 
additional punishment, its imposition does not fall within the legitimate 
discretion of prison officials seeking to promote prison security. Rather, 
before it may be imposed, it must be authorized by the penal statute 
governing the offense of conviction in effect at the time the prisoner 
committed his crime and must be imposed as part of the offender’s sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Solitary confinement is a punishment. The Supreme Court was correct 
when it reached this conclusion in 1890, and more recent cases ignoring this 
conclusion are incorrect. When a prison official inflicts solitary confinement 
on a prisoner without prior statutory and sentencing authorization, that 
official imposes a “punishment without law.” Basic principles of separation 
of powers and individual rights dictate that this practice must stop. 
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